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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the District Court properly denied the Motion to Vacate and

confirmed the Award. The Court's Findings of Fact are reviewed under a "clearly
erroneous standard;" his Conclusions of Law are reviewed for correctness. Buzas
Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996). However,
Appellant, Pacific Development, L.C. (hereinafter "Pacific") assigns no error to the
District court, only to the Arbitrator.
2.

Whether the doctrine of "manifest disregard of the law" provides

grounds for an appeal of an Arbitrator's award in the State of Utah. This is a matter
of first impression. Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941
(Utah 1996).
3.

Whether a trial or appellate court may address the merits of an

Arbitrator's decision. Cade v. Zions First Nat'I Bank, 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah App.
1998)
4.

Whether the Appellee, Eric Orton dba Orton Excavation (hereinafter

"Orton") is entitled to attorneys fees on appeal.
1

Statutes Cited
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ix
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24
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-31a-14: Vacation of the award by court.
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for
vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or
an arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights
of any party;
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown, refused to hear evidence material to the
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to the substantial
prejudice of the rights of a party; or
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to
the arbitration proceeding.
(2) A motion to vacate an award shall be made to the court within 20
days after a copy of the award is served upon the moving party, or if
predicated upon corruption, fraud, or other undue means, within 20 days
after the grounds are known or should have been known.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-31a-15: Modification of award by court.
(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy of the award is served
upon the moving party, the court shall modify or correct the award if it appears
that:
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident
mistake in the description of any person or property referred to in
the award;
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to
them, if the award can be corrected without affecting the merits
of the award upon the issues submitted; or
(c) the award is imperfect as to form.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

On September 20,1995, Pacific filed a complaint in the Fourth District

Court against Orton alleging, causes of action for Wrongful Lien, Slander of Title,
and Defamation of Character. On May 7, 1996, Orton responded by filing his
Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint, alleging causes of action for
Quantum Meruit, Lien Foreclosure, and Failure to Obtain Contractor's Bond.
Thereafter on May 17,1996, Pacific filed their Response to Counterclaim and ThirdParty Complaint.
2.

On June 9,1997, Pacific and Orton, through their respective counsel of

record, executed an Agreement to Arbitrate. The arbitration was held on August 26 27, and September 10, 1997, after which the Arbitrator, Robert Babcock, issued an
Interim Arbitration Award. Thereafter, Pacific filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Shortly thereafter, Orton filed his Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.
3.

The Arbitrator, on December 24, 1997, issued his Final Arbitration

Award. On January 2, 1998, Orton filed a Motion to Confirm Arbitrator's Award
with the Fourth District Court, the Honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen presiding.
Thereafter, on January 22, 1998, Pacific filed a Motion to Vacate or Modify
Arbitration Award together with a supporting Memorandum.
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4.

On February 17,1998, the District Court held a hearing on the Motion

to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, after which, it confirmed the Arbitrator's
Final Arbitration Award. On February 19, 1998, the District Court signed the
Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and Judgment, which was entered that same day.
5.

On March 23, 1998, Pacific filed Notice of Appeal, thereby appealing

to the Utah Supreme Court from the Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and
Judgment. Orton, on or about June 8,1998,fileda Motion for Summary Disposition.
Plaintiffs responded by filing a Response in Opposition to Orton's Motion for
Summary Disposition.
6.

On July 15, 1998, the District Court signed an Order Setting Aside

Judgment Against Plaintiff Otto Belvedere. By way of Order signed on July 27,
1998, the Utah Supreme Court "deferred ruling on appellee's motion for summary
disposition until further consideration . . . " On August 7, 1998, the Utah Supreme
Court poured-over the instant appeal to this Court for disposition.
7.

On October 30,1998, Plaintiff Otto Belvederefileda Stipulated Motion

of Appellant Otto Belvedere to Voluntarily Dismiss Otto Belvedere from Appeal.
Thereafter, on November 3,1998, this Court, by way of Order Dismissing Appellant
Otto Belvedere from Appeal, dismissed Otto Belvedere, solely from the instant
appeal.
4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellant Pacific Development (Pacific) is a developer of residential real

estate. Respondent Eric Orton is an excavation contractor.
2.

Riderwood Village is a residential subdivision in Provo, Utah, developed

by Pacific, consisting of various plats. Eric Orton d/b/a Orton Excavation (Orton)
was contracted to install culinary water, sanitary sewer and storm drain lines, and
perform other excavation services, in Plats B and C. The parties entered into a
subcontract agreement on April 20, 1994, for Plat B; the contract for Plat C was
signed on October 10, 1994. Both agreements were "unit price" contracts. The
October contract contained the following provision regarding fill and bedding
materials to be imported or moved within the site: "Quantities subject to on-site
measuring and delivery invoices and/or trucking slips, after installation." (See R.
172, Final Arbitration Award, paragraph 3.)
3.

Work was performed by Orton for Pacific on both Plat B and Plat C.

(See R. 172, Final Arbitration Award, paragraph 4.)
4.

A dispute arose regarding payment for Orton's work (See R. 169-172,

Final Arbitration Award, paragraph 1-22). Orton recorded a mechanic's lien on the
project, and later brought action to foreclose it. (See R. 166, Final Arbitration Award,
paragraph 27; R.69-80, Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint.)
5

5.

On September 20,1995, Plaintiffs, Pacific Development, L.C. (Pacific),

and Otto Belvedere (Belvedere), through counsel, filed a Complaint in the Fourth
District Court against Defendant Orton alleging causes of action for Wrongful Lien,
Slander of Title, Defamation of Character {See R. 1-7, Complaint).
6.

On May 7, 1996, Orton, through counsel, filed his Answer,

Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint {See R. 69-80, Answer, Counterclaim, and
Third-Party Complaint).
7.

On May 17, 1996, Pacific and Belvedere, through counsel, filed their

Response to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint {See R.81-86, Response to
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint).
8.

On June 9,1997, Pacific and Orton, through their respective counsel of

record, executed an Agreement to Arbitrate {See R. 145, Agreement to Arbitrate, a
true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit A to the Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration
Award; See also Finding of Fact).
9.

The Agreement to Arbitrate, as originally drafted, provided for the

arbitration to be conducted on July 1 & 2, 1997. By verbal agreement, the hearing
was moved to July 17 & 18. Later, it was moved, again by verbal agreement, to
August 12 & 13. Ultimately it was moved, again by verbal agreement, to August 26
6

& 27, and September 10. (See R. 145, Agreement to Arbitrate; Final Arbitration
Award, preamble.)
10.

During the arbitration held on August 26-27, 1997, and concluded on

September 10, 1997, Plat B issues, along with issues on Plat C, were presented by
both parties without objection by Pacific. (See R. 187-92, Interim Arbitration Award;
Transcript of Hearing on Motion, pp. 6-9.)
11.

After receiving an award adverse to Plaintiffs on Plats B and C, Pacific' s

counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the Arbitrator lacked
authority to rule on Plat B issues and requesting the Arbitrator to reconsider his ruling
in light of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which it claimed Orton
breached. (See R. 181-85, Motion for Reconsideration).
12.

Shortly thereafter, Orton filed his Opposition to the Motion for

Reconsideration (See R. 177-80, Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration).
13.

On December 24,1997, the Arbitrator served upon the parties his Final

Arbitration Award, which included, as some of the additional rulings, the following:
25. Pacific's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The Arbitrator
heard the arguments during the course of the proceeding that are being
reargued by Pacific. Pacific's argument is based largely upon its
argument that Orton had within its scope of work the obligation to
perform the rough grading of the roadway. The Arbitrator specifically
found that the contract did not require that work to be done by Orton.
Orton obviously has a duty of good faith and fair dealing with Pacific.
7

The Arbitrator, however, further found that Pacific did not [sic] its
burden of proof of its allegation that Orton wasted material in Plat C.
26. Pacific's contention that the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear
and determine issues as to Plat B is rejected. Pacific is correct in stating
that the arbitration agreement signed on or about June 9, 1997
represented that the issues relating to Plat B had been resolved that the
remaining issues to be resolved at the arbitration related to Plat C. In
actuality, the parties had not in fact reached an agreement on the Plat B
issues. Pacific's assertion in its Motion for Reconsideration that the
issues on Plat B had been resolved and were not to be part of the
arbitration is not supported by the evidence and material provided to the
Arbitrator during the course of the Arbitration. In fact, Pacific
submitted its Pre-Arbitration Statement to the Arbitrator dated August
25, 1997 which included as the first document in Exhibit "C" a
document entitled "Pacific's Development's Amended Responses to
Claims Concerning Plat B." During the course of the proceeding each
of the parties presented evidence on the disputes relating to Plat B. The
Parties clearly submitted those issues to the Arbitrator for resolution.
The Award as it relates to Plat B is not modified. The Arbitrator also
finds that the subcontract agreement required all disputes to be resolved
by arbitration which is what the parties have now done.
(See R. 138, Final Arbitration Award,ffi[25,26; Transcript of Hearing, pp. 9-10). By
way of the Final Arbitration Award, the Arbitrator awarded a net amount to
Defendant of $66,440.24, plus attorney fees in the amount of $17,500.00, and costs
in the amount of $733.50 (Id. at R. 166-67,ffi[22,23, 28,29).
14.

On January 2,1998, Orton filed a Motion to Confirm Arbitrator's Award

with the Fourth District Court, the Honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen presiding (See
R. 124-28, Motion to Confirm Arbitrator's Award).
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15.

On January 22,1998, twenty-eight (28) days after the Award was served

upon them, Pacific filed a Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award together
with a supporting Memorandum (See R. 135-36, Motion to Vacate or Modify
Arbitration Award; R. 137-56, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award).
16.

On February 17,1998, the District Court held a hearing on the Motion

to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award. (See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to
Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, pp. 2-30).
17.

On February 19, 1998, the District Court signed the Confirmation of

Arbitrator's Award and Judgment, which was entered that same day (See R. 230-33,
Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and Judgment).
18.

On March 23, 1998, Pacific filed Notice of Appeal, thereby appealing

to the Utah Supreme Court from the Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and
Judgment (See R. 270-72, Notice of Appeal).
19.

On or about June 8, 1998, Orton, through counsel, filed a Motion for

Summary Disposition together with a supporting Memorandum. Pacific responded
by filing a Response in Opposition to Orton's Motion for Summary Disposition.
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20.

On July 15, 1998, the District Court signed an Order Setting Aside

Judgment Against Plaintiff Otto Belvedere. {See R. 44-45, Order Setting Aside
Default.)
21.

By way of Order signed on July 27, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court

"deferred ruling on appellee's motion for summary disposition until further
consideration..."
22.

On August 7, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the instant

appeal to this Court for disposition.
23.

On October 30,1998, Plaintiff Otto Belvedere filed a Stipulated Motion

of Appellant Otto Belvedere to Voluntarily Dismiss Otto Belvedere from Appeal.
24.

Thereafter, on November 3, 1998, this Court, by way of Order

Dismissing Appellant Otto BelvederefromAppeal, dismissed Otto Belvedere, solely,
from the instant appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Agreement to Arbitrate provided that the arbitration was to focus on the
disputes on Plat C, presuming that the Plat B issues had been previously resolved.
However, as the arbitration began, it became apparent that the agreement on Plat B
issues would not hold. The parties preceded to submit to arbitration the additional
issues relating to Plat B. This was done by mutual consent, and without objection.
10

As a result, the Arbitrator was well within his authority to rule on the Plat B issues,
which he did, and the trial court properly confirmed his Award.
The Arbitrator understood the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealings,
and gave due regard to it in his ruling. Pacific's claim that he manifestly disregarded
the law on that point is totally unsupported by the Arbitrator's Findings of Fact and
Award.
Since no record was made of the proceedings, and because of current law and
public policy favoring Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Arbitrator's Findings of
Fact and Award are not assailable on the merits in a motion before the District Court
or on this Appeal.
Appeals such as this erode the value of Alternative Dispute Resolution as an
alternative to litigation.
Orton is entitled to its attorney's fees on appeal.
ARGUMENTS
L
THE PLAT B ISSUES WERE PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO
THE ARBITRATOR
The parties in this case submitted their dispute to a nonjudicial private
arbitrator pursuant to their written agreement which is attached as Addendum A. See
11

Blanton v. Womancare Inc. 38 Cal.3d 396,401-402 and fii 5,212 Cal.Rptr. 151, 696
P.2d 645 (Cal. 1985) (discussing the differences between judicial and nonjudicial
arbitration). In cases involving private arbitration, "[t]he scope of arbitration is . . .
a matter of agreement between the parties" {Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney
& Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak St. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312,323,197 Cal.Rptr. 581, 673 P.2d
251), and "[t]he powers of an arbitrator are limited and circumscribed by the
agreement or stipulation of submission." (O 'Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co.
48 Cal.2d 107,110,308 P.2d 9 (1957) (quoting Pac. Fire ect. Bureau v. Bookbinders'
Union 115 Cal.App.2d 111, 114, 251 P.2d 694 (1952).)
Under the Utah Arbitration Act, U.C.A. Chapter 78-3la, a district court may
vacate an arbitration award if it appears that:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any
party;
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon specific cause
shown, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise
conducted the hearing to the substantial prejudice of the rights of a
party; or
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the
arbitration proceeding.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3 la-14 (1992).
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Moreover, a court may modify an arbitration award under the Utah Arbitration
Act if it appears that:
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake
in the description of any person or property referred to in the award;
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if
the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award
upon the issues submitted; or
(c) the award is imperfect as to form.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3la-15 (Utah).
It appears from their brief that Pacific is seeking a review of the same two
issues brought out previously in their summation at the conclusion of arbitration, and
in multiple motions and other pleadings which were subsequently denied by the
Arbitrator and the trial court judge. In essence, Pacific is seeking to have this Court,
in its review, vacate the Arbitrator's Award and Judgment.
A.

THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WAS MODIFIED BY
MUTUAL CONSENT

The parties are required to have an agreement to arbitrate. U.C.A. 78-3 la14(e). The parties in this matter entered into a written arbitration agreement, although
there is no requirement that the agreement be reduced to writing. Nothing in the
written Agreement to Arbitrate prevented a modification, or required any
modification to be in writing. In fact, the parties made a number of verbal
modifications of the Agreement before the arbitration began. As can be seen from
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Addendum A, the Agreement specified that the parties initially agreed to arbitrate the
matter on July 1 and July 2,1997. That was changed to July 17 & 18, perhaps before
execution of the Agreement, then changed to August 12 & 13, and then to August 26
and 27, 1997. No new agreement was printed or executed for any of those
modifications.
The first issue Pacific presents is that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by
awarding damages on Plat B, because the parties' Arbitration Agreement ostensibly
limits his review to issues regarding Plat C. The Utah Supreme Court in the Buzas
Baseball case, cited above, stated that:
Generally, to find that an arbitrator has exceeded his authority, a court
must review the submission agreement and determine whether the
arbitrator's award covers areas not contemplated by the submission
agreement. "It is . . . fundamental that the authority of the arbitrator
springs from the agreement to arbitrate."
925 P.2d at 949 (citing Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131
(3d Cir. 1972); See also Western Elec. Co. v. Communications Wkrs. ofAmerica, 450
F.Supp. 876, 881 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The powers of an arbitrator are defined by
agreement of the parties: the questions they submit both establishes and limits the
arbitrator's jurisdiction. It is the reviewing court's duty [under the exceeding
authority test] to determine whether the arbitrator has acted within that jurisdiction.")

14

Reviewing the Arbitration Agreement alone, however, is not sufficient. The
Court must review the actual matters submitted for arbitration to determine the scope
of the arbitrator's power. The consent of the parties as to the presentation of those
matters actually submitted must be considered along with the original agreement to
arbitrate.
Absent [an] express limitation by the parties, the resulting grant
of authority to the Arbitrator is very broad. This includes the ability of
the Arbitrator to frame relief and is reflected in the Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, which states in pertinent part:
SCOPE OF AWARD - The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
which the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of
the agreement of the parties...
(emphasis added) Hecla Min Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861, 868 (Idaho 1980);
See Swift Industries Inc., 466 F.2d at 1131.
The parties may agree to expand an original arbitration proceeding.
Buckhannon v. US West Communications, 928 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Colo. App. 1996)
{citing Leahy v. Guaranty Nat'I Ins. Co., 907 P.2d 697, 699 (Colo. App. 1995):
("The scope of an arbitration panel's jurisdiction depends upon the issues actually
submitted to it for determination in the parties' proposals for arbitration.") See In re:
Arbitration between Lynch & Three Ponds Co., 656 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1982). The
parties may agree to submit to arbitration issues "that they were not contractually
compelled to submit to arbitration." Executone Inf. Sys. Inc., 26 F.3d 1314,1323 (5th
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Cir. 1994); (citing Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Union de Trabajadores de la
Industria Gastronomica de Puerto Rico Local 610,959 F.2d 2,4 (1st Cir. 1992)); See
also Piggly Wiggly Operators Warehouse, Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Operators
Warehouse Indep. Truck Drivers Union, Local No. 1,611 F.2d 580,583-584 (5th Cir.
1980).
Stated otherwise, "even when an arbitration provision specifies the issues to
be submitted to the arbitrators, the parties may agree to submit to arbitration other
matters in dispute between them." Leahy, 907 P.2d at 699, {citing Cabus v. Dairyland
Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 54 (Colo. App. 1982)) ("parties may agree to expand an original
arbitration; [an] expanded agreement [gives] the arbitrator jurisdiction to determine
all matters so submitted.")
The Arbitration Agreement entered in this case dated June 9, 1997, states in
pertinent part:
Further, they acknowledge that the issues relating to the abovereferenced Plat B of Riderwood Village have been resolved, and that,
therefore, the arbitration will focus on the remaining issues of the
dispute, those which relate to Plat C, thereby resolving all remaining
issues in the case.
See Agreement to Arbitrate attached to Pacific's Brief as Addendum "A."
While on its face this Agreement to Arbitrate seems to limit the Arbitrator's
authority to make decisions which relate to Plat C only, this agreement to arbitrate
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was later modified and expanded by the parties during the arbitration itself. This
modification was allowed because nowhere in the Agreement to Arbitrate does it state
that modifications to the agreement have to be in writing. Assuming, arguendo, that
such a provision existed, Pacific would be estopped from arguing that it did not
expand the original arbitration agreement because it presented evidence throughout
the arbitration regarding Plat B. By doing so, it requested that the Arbitrator address
the issues surrounding Plat B.
The reason the arbitration agreement was modified at the outset of the
arbitration was that Pacific would not hold to its earlier agreement on Plat B, which
resolved those issues in Orton's favor. The parties, prior to signing the arbitration
agreement, had come to an agreement regarding Plat B. The agreement was that all
of the extras on Plat B were owing to Orton and were not to be contested. This
agreement is demonstrated by the correspondence that preceded the agreement to
Arbitrate.

Pacific's attorney was sent a letter dated April 28, 1997, which

documented the agreement. (See R. 213-219, April 28, 1997 correspondence from
Richard D. Bradford to Mark Arnold.) Paragraph 3 of that letter states as follows:
I also understand from that same conversation that Plat B was
essentially at a break even, and the amounts owing are on Plat C. I
understand that to mean that the signed and unsigned change orders on
Plat B are no longer contested, and that the only contested issues relate
to the unsigned change orders on Plat C.
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This was clarified in a letter dated June 11,1997. (See R. 209-211, Correspondence
dated June 11,1997, tofromRichard D. Bradford to Mark Arnold.) That reiterated
the agreement as previously stated:
We have also established that Plat B was essentially at a break even, and
the only real factual disputes are on Plat C. I understand that to mean
that the signed and unsigned change orders on Plat B are no longer
contested, and that the only contested issues relate to the unsigned
change orders or additions on Plat C.
This was further clarified in the second and third paragraphs of page 2 of that letter:
The combined reconciliation of Plat B and Plat C shows that [Appellant]
acknowledges owing Orton Excavation [Respondent] $8,916.11 prior to
consideration of any change orders.
At one point, Otto claimed to have overpaid Orton Excavation on Plat
"B" by $46,771.90. However, when all of the extras on Plat "B" are
included (signed change orders = $21,907.85; unsigned change orders
= $24,600.67; total = $46,508.52), those come to within $263.38 of the
$46,771.90 that Belvedere claims to have overpaid. By agreeing to
those extras and changes on Plat "B," that eliminates any remaining
disputes on Plat "B."

These letters made it clear that an agreement was reached on Plat B which
should have precluded Pacific from contesting the signed or unsigned change orders
on Plat B, and which entitled Orton to an additional $46,508.52, effectively wiping
out the claim that Orton was overpaid on Plat B. There is no correspondence that
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counters or questions any portion of the understanding as stated. The Agreement to
Arbitrate was drafted accordingly.
At the outset of the arbitration, however, as the issues were being framed,
Pacific claimed to have misunderstood the effect of the prior agreement that settled
the issues on Plat B. Rather than suffer the delays that would be engendered by
engaging in a dispute over who understood what, both parties mutually proceeded to
present evidence on issues related to Plat B as well as Plat C. Specifically, Pacific
wanted to contest the Plat B change orders discussed in the correspondence above.
Throughout the three days of the arbitration, Pacific presented testimony on Plat B.
At no time during the entire arbitration did Pacific ever voice any objection to
presenting evidence or argument on Plat B.
It is undisputed that the parties ultimately submitted to the Arbitrator issues
relating to both Plat B and Plat C. See also Matteson v. Ryder System, Inc., 99 F.3d
108 (3rd Cir. 1996). This is properly addressed in paragraph 26 of the Final
Arbitration Award, which states as follows:
26. Pacific's contention that the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear
and determine issues as to Plat B is rejected. Pacific is correct in stating
that the arbitration agreement signed on or about June 9, 1997
represented that the issues relating to Plat B had been resolved that the
remaining issues to be resolved at the arbitration related to Plat C. In
actuality, the parties had not in fact reached an agreement on the Plat
B issues. Pacific's assertion in it Motion for Reconsideration that the
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issues on Plat B were resolved and were not to be part of the arbitration
is not supported by the evidence and material presented to the
Arbitrator during the course of the Arbitration. In fact, Pacific
submitted its Pre-Arbitration Statement to the Arbitrator dated August
25, 1997 which included as the first document in Exhibit "C" a
document entitled "Pacific Development's Amended Responses to
Claims Concerning Plat B". During the course of the proceeding each
of the parties presented evidence on the disputes relating to Plat B. The
Parties clearly submitted those issues to the Arbitrator for resolution.
The Award as it relates to Plat B is not modified...
(emphasis added.)
Numerous courts, including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals have followed
the Appellees' position holding that:
If the parties go beyond their promise to arbitrate and actually submit an
issue to the arbitrator, we look both to the contract and to the scope of
the submissions to the arbitrator to determine the arbitrator's authority.
Executonelnf Systems, Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d at 1314 (citing Piggly Wiggly, 611 F.2d
at 584); see also United Food & Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7R v.
Safeway Stores., Inc., 889 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1989); Sun Ship Inc. v. Matson
Navig. Co., 785 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986).
The inevitable conclusion is that a party may not submit an issue to arbitration
and then, as Pacific is doing here, challenge the authority of the Arbitrator to act on
the very issue when it obtains an unfavorable result. Wages v. Smith Barney Harris
Upham & Co., 937 P.2d 715, 720 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1997). See Ficek v. Southern
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Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655,657 (9th Cir. 1964), cert, denied 380 U.S. 988,85 S.Ct. 1362,
14 L.Ed.2d 280 (1965). Finally, code sections 78-31a-14 and 78-31a-15 Utah Code
Annotated, which govern the vacation or modification of an arbitration award do not
allow a court to either modify or vacate an award simply because the party disagrees
with the Arbitrator's award on the merits.
B.

THE APPELLANTS DID NOT OBJECT DURING THE
PROCEEDING.

Pacific never objected to the evidence being submitted by either party
regarding Plat B during the arbitration, and in fact requested the opportunity to
submit. Appellant is therefore estopped from arguing that the Arbitrator exceeded his
authority by making a ruling on the issues relating to Plat B and awarding damages
on it.
A party waives the right to dispute the matter by participating in the arbitration
without objection. Russell v. World Famous, Inc., 767 P.2d 456 (Or. App. 1989)
(citing Mendelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590 P.2d 726 (Or. 1979)). This
same argument was also followed by the Supreme Court of Alaska in Ebasco
Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna, 932 P.2d 1312,1317 (Alaska 1997) where the court held
that the party to an arbitration waived its right to argue to the court that the arbitrator
should not have considered the new argument for recovery presented for the first time
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on the initial day of arbitration because the party's counsel had failed to make an
objection before the arbitrator concerning the introduction of the new matter. See
Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. v. Strube Construction Co., 715 P.2d 540 (Wyo. 1986)
(school district which had chosen to not object to the arbitrability of the dispute but
chose instead to participate in hopes of a favorable result, was foreclosed from raising
the issue of arbitrability on a motion to confirm or vacate the award.); Five Keys Inc.
v. Pizza Inn, Inc., 653 P.2d 870 (N.M. 1982) (court held that although the arbitration
award was untimely made, the Plaintiffs had waived their right to object by waiting
until after the award was made to complain of its untimeliness. "A party should not
be permitted to wait and see whether the arbitrator will rule in his or her favor before
asserting his or her objection."); Ash Apartments v. Martinez, 656 P.2d 708 (Colo.
App. 1982) (Plaintiffs had by their own conduct waived their right to object to the
timeliness of the award until after the announcement of the result which was
unfavorable to them.); Alaska State Hous. v. Riley Pleas Inc., 586 P.2d 1244 (Alaska
1978) (holding that, where State Housing Authority did not raise objection to alleged
bias of arbitrator at arbitration hearing, it waived its right to object, even though it
believed that challenge would be ineffective and would only serve to worsen its
chances of obtaining a favorable result).
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Pacific admits that it made no objections regarding the Appellee's submission
of evidence on Plat B, (See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Vacate, pp.6-9) and
in fact brought in their own evidence regarding Plat B. (See Award of Arbitration,
para. 25) Having done so, Pacific is now barredfromraising the issues on appeal, or
arguing that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by ruling on Plat B issues.
C.

THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT REQUIRED ALL
DISPUTES TO BE SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION,
WHICH THE PARTIES DID.

The final sentence of paragraph 26 of the Final Arbitration Award states as
follows:
. . . The Arbitrator alsofindsthat the subcontract agreement required all
disputes to be resolved by arbitration which is what the parties have now
done.
Therefore, under a binary analysis, either the Plat B issues were resolved by the
prior agreements or they were not. If they were, then justice and fairness would
require that Pacific be held to that. As a result, Orton would get an additional
$20,000.00, and poetic justice. If they were not so resolved, then the subcontract
agreement required them to be submitted to arbitration, which they were, as
evidenced by the preceding argument.
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II.
THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT MANIFESTLY DISREGARD THE LAW
A party seeking to vacate or modify an arbitration award must prove that one
of the grounds specified in the statutes governing the vacating or modification of
arbitration awards exists.
It appears that Pacific's second argument is that the Arbitrator disregarded well
established contract law concerning the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing,
and by doing that, exceeded his authority under Section 78-3 la-14(c).
"Manifest disregard of the law" is a "judicially-created doctrine stemming
from the 'exceeding authority' statutory ground." Buzas Baseball, 925 P.2d at 951;
see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37, 74 S.Ct. 182, 187, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953)
("[T]he interpretations of the law by the arbitrators[,] in contrast to manifest
disregard[,] are not subject... to judicial review for error . ..) (emphasis added);
Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 21A F.2d 805,
808 (2d Cir. 1960). As the Utah Supreme Court noted in Buzas, "[i]f arbitrators
manifestly disregard the law in making their award, they can be said to have exceeded
their authority," but "manifest disregard is much more than mere error as to the law."
Id. at 951. The Second Circuit of Appeals in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
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Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (1986) has stated in reference to the "manifest
disregard" standard:
Although the bounds of this grounds have never been defined, it clearly
means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law. The
error must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly
perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.
Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator appreciates the
existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or
pay no attention to it.
Id. at 933 (citations omitted).
In the present case, there is no record upon which Pacific can establish that the
Arbitrator, though he knew of the contract law concerning the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing, nevertheless blatantly disregarded it. The alleged error is not
apparent on its face. And nowhere in all the motions and other pleadings that Pacific
hasfiledhas it shown evidence that the Arbitrator knew and correctly stated the law
but chose to ignore it in fashioning his award. The Arbitrator heard all the evidence
and simply made his decision on the facts. It appears that Pacific's claim regarding
the Arbitrator's "disregard of the law" amounts to nothing more than their
"disagreement" with the Arbitrator regarding the issue of whether Orton did or did
not utilize too much material in the course of providing services on Plat C. There is
no evidence presented by Pacific which meet the "manifestly disregarded" burden
and thus the statutory ground of exceeding authority cannot be found in our case.
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In addition, even if the Arbitrator had made an error in his application of the
law or interpretation of the law, that is still not grounds for a reversal of the
Arbitrator's decision. Eljer Mfg Inc. v. Kowin Development Corp., 14 F.3d 1250 (7th
Cir. 1994); see Bowles Financial Group Inc., v. Stifel, Nicolaus, & Co. Inc., 22 F.3d
1010 (10th Cir. 1994) (errors in arbitrator's interpretation of law or findings of fact
do not merit reversal under the de novo standard of review).
Moreover, it should be noted that, in footnote 8 of the Buzas Baseball opinion
cited in this section, the Supreme Court held that, while it analyzed the "manifest
disregard of the law" ground because it was raised by the Appellant there and relied
upon by the trial court below, that the Court reserved the issue of whether that
ground was even recognized in Utah. Orton can find no other Utah cases that have
dealt with the issue of manifest disregard since the Buzas decision and thus, under the
present statute, the "manifest disregard of the law" argument is not even adopted in
Utah.
This court should also be persuaded by the numerous other jurisdictions which
have not allowed the vacation of the arbitrator's decision based on the "manifest
disregard of the law" argument. It is helpful, and very persuasive, to look to the
decisions of other states, and view their interpretation of identical statutory language.
SeeLoomis, Inc. v. Cueahy, 656 P.2d 1359 (Idaho 1982).
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For instance some courts have held that "[b]y voluntarily agreeing to arbitrate,
the parties thereby assumed all the hazards of the arbitration process, including the
risk that the arbitrators may make mistakes in the application of law and in their
findings of fact." Gadd v. Kelley, 667 P.2d 251 (Haw. 1983) {quoting Mars
Constructors, Inc. v. Tropical Enterprises Ltd., 460 P.2d 317, 319-20 (Haw. 1969)).
The simple fact that "an arbitrator may err in applying the law, finding facts, or
construing the contract, or enters an award that is contrary to the evidence adduced,
is insufficient grounds for judicial review." Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Makahuena
Corp., 675 P.2d 760, 766 (Haw. 1983) {quoting University of Hawaii Professional
Assembly ex rel Daeufer, 659 P.2d 720, 726-28 (Haw. 1983)) (emphasis added).
The Kansas Supreme Court has also held that "[n]othing in the award relating
to the merits of the controversy, even though incorrectly decided, is grounds for
setting aside the award in the absence of fraud, misconduct, or other valid
objections." Jackson Irak Group v. Mid States Port A, 751 P.2d 122, 127 (Kan.
1988). (emphasis added). Pacific has failed to showfraud,misconduct or other valid
objections which would allow a modification or vacation of the award.
The Utah Federal District Court, in analyzing the "manifest disregard of the
law argument," characterized the term to be "willful inattentiveness to the governing
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law." Jeppsen v. Piper, Jajfray & Hopwood, Inc. 879 F.Supp. 1130 (D. Utah 1995)
{citing Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988)).

A.

THE APPELLANT DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF
PROOF

Pacific argues "manifest disregard of the law," but the argument quickly
evaporates in light of the fact that the facts do not support any finding that the duty
of good faith and fair dealings was breached. The Arbitrator heard the arguments
regarding this issue, but he simply found the facts to be against Pacific, stating,"...
Pacific did not meet its burden of proof of its allegation that Orton wasted material
in Plat C." Paragraph 26, Final Arbitration Award. This is more fully elucidated in
paragraph 22:
... The Arbitrator does not find that the evidence supports a finding that
Orton wasted material. There was evidence presented by Pacific that
more material was used in Plat C than maybe Pacific thought should
have been used. Pacific, however, did not meet its burden on that issue.
The computation of Fred Clark were general in nature omitting some
lengths of pipe installation, assumed that Orton was responsible to cut
the road for rough grading, etc.
(emphasis added.)
From these Findings, we clearly see that Pacific did not meet its burden of
proof on its claim of breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Without the
factual basis, the entire argument on the law is moot. There is no amount of judicial
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or appellate review that can validate Pacific's argument, since the facts do not fit.
This really is the death knell of Pacific's "manifest disregard of the law" argument.
B.

THE AWARD RECOGNIZES AND APPLIES THE
PRINCIPLE OF LAW

The Appellants cannot show that the Arbitrator's decision involved any wilful
inattentiveness to the governing law. In fact, in paragraph 25 of the Final Arbitration
Award, the Arbitrator demonstrates that he recognized and understood the principle,
as well as Pacific's argument, when he stated, " . . . Orton obviously has a duty of
good faith and fair dealing with Pacific." However, the Arbitrator went on to find
that Pacific simply did not meet its burden of proof as stated above. Therefore, it is
clear that there was no manifest disregard of the law. The Arbitrator understood it
and applied it properly to the facts of the case.
C.

THE ARBITRATOR DID NOT IMPOSE A NEW TERM OF
THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT — THE PARTIES
INCLUDED IT THEMSELVES.

Pacific claims that the Arbitrator not only manifested disregard for the law, but
also implied a new term in the unit contract by requiring that Pacific hire an
employee, such as an engineer, to monitor the fill material used by Orton. While
Pacific does not claim this to be a "manifest disregard of the law," it appears to assign
some error to the Arbitrator in this matter. However, Pacific seems to overlook the

29

fact that, the contract on Plat C, dated October 10, 1994, contained the following
language in the addendum: "Quantities subject to on-site measuring and delivery
invoices and/or trucking slips, after installation."

(Final Arbitration Award,

paragraph 3.) Thus we see that the requirement of on-site monitoring was not a term
imposed by the Arbitrator, but was a term of the subcontract agreement entered into
by the parties on Plat C. Pacific's failure to provide such monitoring was a result of
the neglect of its own contractual duty. No error can be assigned to the Arbitrator.
III.
NEITHER CURRENT LAW NOR PUBLIC POLICY ALLOW THE
APPELLATE COURTS TO VACATE OR MODIFY THE ARBITRATOR'S
DECISION ON THE MERITS
There are a number of reasons that the Arbitrator's decision cannot be assailed
on its merits, aside from the fact that, on its merits, it is correct.
It was Orton's position and understanding when he submitted the case to
arbitration that the parties were going to commit themselves to abide by the decision
of the Arbitrator. The benefits of arbitration include, among others, speedier
resolution of disputes, avoidance of juries, participation in the selection of the
decision maker, less formality and expense, and more confidentiality. Orton expected
that the dispute would be resolved without further contact with the courts, except for
a perfunctory confirmation of the award if there arose a need for judicial enforcement.
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It is these advantages, commonly touted by the Courts, and, in large part, the desire
to avoid the prospect of delays and costs of judicial trials and appeals, that encourage
litigants to enter into arbitration. (See Andreas F. Lowenfield, Can Arbitration
Coexist with Judicial Review. A Critique ofLaPine v. Kyocera Sept. 1998 at 1.,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ;

LaPine v. Kyocera, 909 F. Supp. 697 (N.D.

Cal. 1995).
Judicial review of arbitration proceedings, however, does not support the
advantages usually contemplated by those who may choose arbitration as an effective
form of alternative dispute resolution. Id. In fact, it goes against the public policy
which supports those aspects of arbitration which are beneficial to the parties as well
as to the courts whose responsibilities are eased. Id.
Appellate review of the merits of this case will inevitably prolong (and in fact
already has prolonged) the process of arbitration, negating the expeditiousness that
was once one of the most important advantages to these parties of engaging in
arbitration. Orton's position is well supported in case law. The United States District
Court, in the Northern Division of California stated in Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase,
10Cal.Rptr.2dl83(1992):
Indeed, the very essence of the term arbitration connotes a binding
award. (Blanton v. Womancare Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at p.402, 212
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Cal.Rptr. 151, 696 P.2d 645 (1985), citing Domke on Commercial
Arbitration (rev. ed. 1984) p.l.)
* * * *

As a consequence, arbitration awards are generally immune from
judicial review. Parties who stipulate in an agreement that controversies
that may arise out of it shall be settled by arbitration, may expect not
only to reap the advantages that flow from the use of that nontechnical,
summary procedure, but also to find themselves bound by an award
reached by paths neither marked nor traceable and not subject to judicial
review. (Case v. Alperson (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 757, 759, 5 Cal.Rptr.
635 . . .) (Nogueiro v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals 203 Cal.App.3d
1192, 1195, 250 Cal.Rptr. 478 (1988).)
Id. at 187-88
Based on the law and these enumerated facts, this Court should not allow
Pacific, as a disappointed party, to bring its dispute into the Court by the back door,
claiming an entitlement to appellate review of the Arbitrator's decision. Allowing
appellate review of final decision by the Arbitrator undermines the very essence of
alternative dispute resolution. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d
704 (7th Cir. 1994) ; United Paperworkers Intern. Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29,
36, 108 S.Ct. 364, 369, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987); Chicago Typographical Union v.
Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-06 (7th Cir. 1991); Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 768 F.2d 914, 921
(7th Cir. 1985).
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The delays in this case have eroded the motivation of the parties to arbitrate
matters instead of litigating the matters in court. This case was originally scheduled
to be arbitrated during the summer of 1996.

Pacific obtained a series of

postponements, and the arbitration hearing wasfinallyheld at the end of August, with
a final hearing date of September 10, 1997. The Interim Arbitration Award was
issued on November 7, 1997. Pacific objected to the award of attorneys fees and
moved for reconsideration of the Award on the same two grounds discussed in
Pacific's Brief. The Arbitrator addressed these issues in his final Arbitration Award
on December 24,1997. After the Final Award was issued, Pacific filed, on January
22,1997, a Motion to Vacate or Modify the Arbitration Award, again addressing only
the same two issues that are raised in this Appeal. That Motion was subsequently
denied and the Arbitrator's decision was confirmed by the trial court. Subsequently,
this appeal was taken, and the final decision cannot be expected much before the
three-year mark after first agreeing to arbitrate.
The expectation offinalitystrongly influences the parties' choice of an arbitral
forum over a judicial on. The arbitrator's decision should be the end, not the
beginning, of the dispute. {See Feldman, Arbitration Modernized — The New
California Arbitration Act 34 So.Cal.L.Rev. 413, 414, fh.l 1 (1961)) Expanding the
availability ofjudicial review of such decisions would tend to deprive the parties to
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the arbitration agreement of the very advantages the process is intended to produce.
(Victoria v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.3d at 751, 222 Cal.Rptr. 1,710 P.2d 833
(Cal. 1985) [dis. opn. of Lucas, J.]; see generally, Judicial Deference, supra, 23
UCLAL.Revatp. 949.)
[conclusiveness is expected; an essence of the arbitration process is that
an arbitral award shall put the dispute to rest. (Comment, Judicial
Deference to Arbitral Determinations: Continuing Problems of Power
and Finality 23 UCLA L.Rev 948-949 (1976).) It has thus been
observed that, the parties [to an arbitration] can take a measure of
comfort in knowing that the arbitrator's award will almost certainly
mean an end to the dispute. (Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration §6:10,
p. 140.(1987))

A.

THE APPELLATE COURT REVIEWS ONLY THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, NOT THE AWARD
OF THE ARBITRATOR

Pacific is requesting a review of the underlying merits of the arbitration which
were decided against it. In doing so, it is asking the Court of Appeals to review the
decision of the Arbitrator, which it has no authority to do, under either statutory or
case law. It is this Court's duty to only review the trial court's decision and not the
Arbitrator's decision.
The trial court, faced with a motion for modification or vacatur, is limited to
determining whether any of the very limited grounds exist.

34

The standard of review for a Utah trial court reviewing an arbitration award is
an extremely narrow and limited one. See Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers,
Inc., 925 P.2d 941 (Utah 1996). "The [trial] court should give considerable leeway
to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow
circumstances." Id. citing First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995),
115 S.Ct. 1920,131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995); seeJeppsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood,
Inc., 879 F. Supp 1130 (D. Utah 1985) (quoting Litvak Packing Co. v. United Food
& Commercial Workers, Local Union No. 7,886 F.2d 275,276 (10th Cir. 1989)) (the
standard of review for an arbitrator award "is among the narrowest known to the
law.") These narrow and limited circumstances are outlined at sections 78-3la-14
and 78-3 la-15 of the Utah Code Annotated. A trial court faced with a motion to
vacate or modify an arbitration award is limited to determining whether any of the
very limited grounds for modification or vacatur exist. Id.
It is very clear though in both State and Federal courts that the trial court may
not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator who has reviewed all of the
evidence, nor may it modify or vacate an award just because it disagrees with the
arbitrator's assessment. Id. at 948; see United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco
Inc., 484 U.S. 29,38 ,108 S.Ct. 364-370-71,98 L.Ed 286 (1987); see also Robinson
& Wells P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1983); Giannopulos v. Pappas, 15
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P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1923) (Ordinarily a court has no authority to review the action
of arbitrators to correct errors or to substitute its conclusion for that of the arbitrator);
Bivans v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 174 P. 1126 (Utah 1980) ("[A]wards
will not be disturbed on account of irregularities or informalities, or because the court
does not agree with the award...").
Perhaps the most important reason, though, is that trial courts:
. . . do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as
an appellee court does in reviewing the decisions of lower courts...if the
[trial] courts were free to intervene on these grounds, the speedy
resolution of grievances by private mechanisms would be greatly
undermined." Buzas, 925 P.2d at 948 quotingMisco, 484 U.S. at 38.
This principle, that a trial court must give deference to the arbitrator's decision
and that review is extremely limited, is also supported by the federal court system.
The 10th Circuit has stated:
Once an arbitration award is entered, the finality that [trial] courts
should afford the arbitration process weighs heavily in favor of the
award, and [trial] courts must exercise great caution when asked to set
aside an award. Because a primary purpose behind arbitration
agreements is to avoid the expense and delay of court proceedings, it is
well settled that judicial review of an arbitration award is very narrowly
limited.
Foster v. Turly, 808 F.2d 38,42 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
This same line of reasoning was applied by the federal court in Colorado,
where the District Court in CheckRite of San Jose, Inc. v. CheckRite, Ltd., 640
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F.Supp. 234 (D. Colo. 1986) stated reasons behind not setting aside an arbitrator's
award, and instead giving deference to that award:
Judicial review of an award following properly conducted arbitration
proceedings is extremely narrow, and an arbitrator's award will not be
set aside unless it fails to "draw its essence from the collector's
bargaining agreement." Once an arbitration award is entered, the finality
of arbitration weighs heavily in its favor and cannot be upset except
under exceptional circumstances. Parties who agreed to submit matters
to arbitration are "presumed to agree that everything, both as to law and
fact, necessary to render an ultimate decision, is included in the
authority of the arbitrator." Courts are expected to and justified in
exercising caution when asked to vacate an arbitration award, which is
the product of the theoretically informal, speedy and inexpensive
process of arbitration,freelychosen by the parties. Further when a party
attacks the validity of such an award, the party has the burden of
sustaining such an attack. The policy behind upholding final arbitration
awards is the settlement of disputes amicably and quickly without
extensive judicial intervention; speed and inexpensiveness are essential
qualities of the arbitration process. In order to preserve these qualities
and thereby retain the effectiveness of the arbitral system, it is essential
that the federal courts recognize that the arbitrator is in the best position
to make decisions relating to and affecting the parties to the arbitration,
and to defer to the arbitrator[']s judgment, absent abuse of his power.
Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
The sense of Pacific's brief is that it is not, in fact, asking that the trial court's
decision be reviewed, but instead that the Arbitrator's decision be reviewed. Pacific
urges that the Arbitrator came to the wrong conclusion, therefore the trial court's
refusal to vacate it should be reversed. Yet there is no error assigned to the trial
court in all of Pacific's brief.
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The trial court was correct in its review of Pacific's Motion to Vacate or
Modify Arbitration Award as evidenced by the transcript of the hearing. See
Transcript of the Hearing on Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award pp. 2-31.
Its review was narrow and followed the statutory requirements.
B.

NEITHER THE DISTRICT COURT NOR THE
APPELLATE COURT CAN REACH THE MERITS

The review by a District Court Judge of an Arbitration Award is not what is
contemplated in an appellate review. The Trial Court does not sit as an appellate
court, and cannot modify or vacate the award on the merits. It cannot even reconsider
the merits of the arbitration. This was alluded to in a recent Utah case, Case v. Zions
First Nat'I Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, at 1081:
. . . the only step left in the process was either confirmation or vacation
of the award by the trial court which did not involve reconsideration of
the merits of arbitration award . . .
Though not central to the holdings of the case, this statement clearly
demonstrates the underlying assumption that district courts are not to reach the merits
of an Arbitrator's decision.
When a trial court considers a motion to vacate or modify an arbitrator's award,
it reviews the process o/the arbitration and not the merits of the arbitration. This was
contemplated by our legislature in drafting the statute. That statute clearly states:
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Upon motion to the court by any party to the arbitration proceeding for
vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears:
(a) the award was procured by corruption,fraudor other undue means;
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an
arbitrator was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any
party;
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon specific cause
shown, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise
conducted the hearing to the substantial prejudice of the rights of a
party; or
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the
arbitration proceeding.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-3la-14.
Moreover, a court may modify an arbitration award under the Utah Arbitration
Act if it appears that:
(a) there was an evident miscalculation offiguresor an evident mistake
in the description of any person or property referred to in the award;
(b) the arbitrators' award is based on a matter not submitted to them, if
the award can be corrected without affecting the merits of the award
upon the issues submitted; or
(c) the award is imperfect as to form.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3 la-15.
All of these grounds seem to deal with the fairness of the arbitration process,
or assuring the process be free of "corruption, fraud or other undue means;" that the
arbitrator is neutral or impartial, and not "guilty of misconduct;" that the arbitrator
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grant a postponement upon timely notice and under appropriate circumstances; that
the arbitration be by voluntary agreement; that there exists no miscalculation or
clerical error. Under these circumstances, the statutes allow the trial courts to review
the process of the arbitration but in no way do they allow the trial court to review the
underlying Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law. The trial court is not an
appellate court for arbitrators. It merely safeguards the integrity of the process.

C.

THE PARTIES AGREED TO BE BOUND BY THE
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD

Finally, it should also be noted that the parties' Agreement to Arbitrate
contains a provision that "[t]he parties agree that they will abide by the Award
rendered by the Arbitrator..." . (See Addendum "A.")
This is an expression of the parties' intent to waive the right to appeal the
Arbitrator's decision, and effectively precludes this appeal on the merits, despite what
the Appellant perceives as an unfavorable result.
IV.
THE APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Orton prevailed below, and was awarded attorneys fees, including afteraccruing attorneys fees as may be shown by affidavit. Having prevailed below,
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Appellee is entitled to attorneys fees on appeal. Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9 (Utah
App. 1994); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992).
CONCLUSION
Pacific is really somewhat misguided in this appeal. It raises two points,
attacking the Arbitrator's Award. However, the only actions this Court can review
are those of the Trial Court, and the Trial Court committed no error.
The Appellant did not have the ammunition to convince the Trial Court to
vacate or modify the Award, so all the Court could do was to confirm it, which he
did. Now the identical arguments, which were unsuccessful there, are paraded before
this Court, dressed up a bit in their finery. This Court can do no more with them than
the Trial Court could—in fact, even less. This Court can do nothing to change the
Arbitrator's Award. The Appellant's dissatisfaction with the result does not translate
into any action this Court can take to change it. The Appellant assigns error to the
Arbitrator, and assigns none to the Trial Court; there was in fact no error by either.
Yet somehow the Appellant requests that the Trial Court be reversed because of a
claim that the Arbitrator did not "get it right." That does not make a lot of sense.
Thus there seems to be something vaguely misguided about this appeal.
Although this appeal should never reach the merits of the Arbitrator's Award,
it should not hurt to point out that the Arbitrator was right, after all.
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First, he ruled on the issues that were submitted to him. Pacific admitted that
no objection was made to arbitrating all of the disputes, including Plat B, until after
the Award was handed down. Far from objecting during the arbitration, Pacific
submitted extensive evidence and argument of its own on Plat B issues. Pacific may
not benefit from a situation it set up, as though a trap.
On the second point, the claim of "manifest disregard of the law," Pacific lost
on the facts. It did not meet its burden ofproof. Without the facts to support the
legal argument, it is dead on arrival with no hope of a resurrection. The Arbitrator
is a bright fellow. He understood the law on good faith and fair dealings. The facts
of the case simply did not support its application.
With rigor mortis having set in on the two arguments made by Pacific, we step
back to look at the big picture on Alternative Dispute Resolution. This Court can
advance the cause of binding arbitration by taking the opportunity, in this case, to
protect others who opt for arbitration they should be spared the agony of undue delay
and the expense of appeal. It should be made clear that there is no review of the
merits of an arbitration award, either before a trial court or before an appellate court.
The court system can still safeguard the integrity of the process of arbitration, while
refusing to hear appeals on the merits of an award. One of the features of arbitration
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should be that it nearly always means an end to the dispute. This situation best serves
the public and the judicial system.
The lower Court's ruling should be affirmed or, in the alternative, the Motion
for Summary Disposition should now be granted and attorneys fees and costs should
be awarded to Orton.
DATED this

day of January,

Attorneys for Eric Orton dba Orton Excavation
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Richard D. Bradford, hereby certify that I personally caused to be mailed,
postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE, to the following on this

day of January, 1999:
Scott L. Wiggins
Diana L. Garrett
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200Si
Salt Lake^itv^ Utah/84101
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Addendum A

SEE ADDENDUM "A"
OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Addendum B

SEE ADDENDUM "B"
OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Addendum C

SEE ADDENDUM "C"
OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Addendum D

SEE ADDENDUM "D"
OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Addendum E

LAW OFFICES

BRADFORD, BRADY & JOHNSON, L.C.
389 North Universuy Avenue
P.O. Box432
Provo, Utah 84603
Richard D. Bradford
M. James Brady
S. Austin Johnson
James E. Bean

Telephone: (801) 374-6272
Facsimile: (801) 374-6282

April 28, 1997

Mark E. Arnold
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 404
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RE:

Pacific Development v. Eric Orton

Dear Mark:
It is unfortunate that our schedules did not permit our meeting to occur as scheduled last
Wednesday. However, in anticipation of a meeting in the near future, I am writing to clarify my
current understanding as to various issues, to render an accounting as to the amounts owed, and to
provide you with our settlement position.
According to our discussions a week ago last Wednesday, the Plaintiffs are dropping their
claims relating to the defamation causes of action.
I also understand from that same conversation that Plat B was essentially at a break even, and
the amounts owing are on Plat C. I understand that to mean that the signed and unsigned change
orders on Plat B are no longer contested, and that the only contested issues relate to the unsigned
change orders on Plat C.
We also agreed, on the issue of the change orders, that as stated by Otto Belvedere in his
deposition, any work ordered or authorized by Otto, John, or anyone else in authority on the project,
would be paid regardless of whether a change order was prepared or signed.
We provided to you earlier an explanation regarding the thirteen (13) change orders on Plat
C, and you responded with Mr. Belvedere's corresponding explanations.
In preparation for our meeting on Wednesday, my paralegal and I did a more thorough review
of the accounting. A summary of the accounting follows. Backup documentation is available for
each of these items.

Mark E. Arnold
April 28, 1997
Page 2

To insure fairness, and to simplify the accounting as much as possible, I have taken as the
starting point Otto Belvedere's own accounting reconciliations. According to Dave Schiess, Otto's
Accountant, his express instructions were to prepare these reconciliations on the base contract only
and without regard to any changes, extras, or additions.
The combined reconciliation of Plat B and Plat C shows that Otto acknowledges owing Orton
Excavation $8,916.11 prior to consideration of the change orders.
The signed and unsigned change orders on Plat B total 546,508.52. The change orders from
Plat C add an additional 565,263.98. This brings the total so far to 5120,688.61.
In the process of reviewing the accounting, we also discovered a number of items that were
included in the Mountainland credit against Orton Excavation which were improperly credited.
They were either not used on the job at all, or were not used in connection with Orton Excavation's
portion of the contract. These are further detailed in the attached spread sheet, and I have backup
documentation regarding each of these credits that we claim have been improperly taken. You may
want to review each of those individually when we meet. This adds an additional 532,467.74.
We also noted that the amounts paid to Mountainland included finance charges. Since the
agreement was that Pacific Development would pay the Mountainland invoices directly, any delay
in paying those bills, resulting in service charges, should not be charged against Orton Excavation.
We therefore add those back in the amount of 59.922.50.
This brings us to a total principal balance, prior to the addition of interest or attorney's fees
to 5163,078.85.
As to the calculation of interest, it is a very complex matter to calculate the interest on each
invoice from the due date forward. It is further complicated by the timing of the sequence of all the
payments. Therefore, in order to simplify the calculation of interest and to give Pacific Development
a break. I have calculated interest at the legal rate, beginning thirty (30) days after completion of all
work. This figure therefore includes no interest for the first year and a half of the project.
Calculating interest at the legal rate of 10%, the interest amounts to 530,515.85
Attorney fees, as provided by statute as well as by contract, together with costs to date,
amounts to 521,652.46.
Any settlement figures we might have discussed previously would not have taken into
account the excludable amounts paid to Mountainland.
There are other damages which my client considers to be significant, including lost
opportunity costs, loss of equity, and loss of utility in his equipment when it was repossessed. Eric

001 Q

Mark E. Arnold
April 28, 1997
Page 3

claims that his inability to make his equipment payments was directly related to Mr. Belvedere's
failure to make payments as promised.
Notwithstanding these additional claims, I believe that you and I both are of the opinion that
this case should be setded to our clients' mutual advantage. I have advised my clients that in order
to achieve a settiement, they cannot expect to receive all of their money with all of their interest and
attorney's fees. I have recommended that they make an offer which involves a very significant
discount to motivate Pacific Development to come to settlement quickly.
We do not have a lot of time at this juncture to get this case settled. I generally do not like
"take it or leave it" offers, but I have encouraged my clients to make their best offer first. We need
to know now if this case is going to settle before we put significant additional time into preparation
for arbitration or litigation.
Accordingly. I am authorized to offer the following settlement. Orton Excavation will accept
the sum of SI50,000.00 as one lump sum cash payment, in full settlement of all claims and for
release of all liens. This offer is open until May 9,1997, at which time it is automatically withdrawn
if not accepted.
This figure discounts all of the interest, all of the attorney's fees and costs, and gives a
significant discount for disputed items on the change orders and disallowed invoices.
Please do not submit a counter offer for a lesser amount unless Mr. Belvedere can show a
compelling reason to revise his accounting, and can back it up with documentation, or a similarly
compelling reason, with backup documentation, to contest the disallowed Mountainland charges.
All of the backup documentation is in Mr. Belvedere's files, and our accounting is simply
taken from those documents. However, if you wish to view my documents and summaries for
convenience, I will make myself available whenever possible for that review.
Please discuss this settlement proposal and the rationale behind it at your earliest opportunity.
I hope to hear from you well before the deadline.

RDB:dvc
cc:

Eric Orton
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MASTER ACCOUNTING
Based on Belvedere's Plats B & C Reconciliation and
Orton's Signed and Unsigned Change Orders for Plats B & C

Belvedere's Plats B & C Reconciliation Total

]

8,916.11 |

Orton's Signed Change Orders for Plat B

|

21,907.85 J

Orton's Unsigned Change Orders for Plat B

|

24,600.67 J

Orton's Unsigned Change Orders for Plat C

65.263.98 I

Mountainland Invoices Not Chargeable to Orton

32.467.74 I

Mountainland Finance Charges Not Chargeable to Orton

9,922.50 I

Interest
I Attorney's Fees
1

MASTER ACCOUNTING
April 28 1997-Pme 1

30,515.85 I
|

21.652.46 |

TOTAL DUE TO ORTON: [

S215,247.16 1
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INVOICKS NOT CHA' 'EAIILE TO ORTON
SUPPLIER

HINDER 1
DATE
PACE// |

INVOICE//

Needs explanation.

584828

65

1 6/30/94 1 Clierne Test 3

66

1 6/30/94 1 CL350 Ductile Pipe

7,358.75 1 Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25

1

7/13/94

CL350 Ductile Pipe

4,437.00 1 Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25

74

1 7/15/94

CL350 Ductile Pipe

3,944.00

589154

77

J 7/18/94 J CL350 Ductile Pipe

590127

79

7/20/94

CI ,350 Ductile Pipe

592978

90

7/29/94

629364

143

638883
644144

1

Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25

3,284.25 1 Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25
1

7,235.50

Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25

Type K. Soft Copper

2,000.00

Bid at $1.23-Charged $4.17

11/23/94

10" PVC Sewer Wye

430.80

Bid at $3.44-Charged $3.55

168

12/30/94

Customer Order - Personal

180

1/24/95

Customer Order - Plat C-2 Job

16.51

Not used by Orton Excavation

346.32

Not used by Orton Excavation

657969

1

205

3/20/95

Type K. Soft Copper

657970

1

206

3/20/95

4" PVC Sewer Pipe

217

4/4/95

10" PVC Sewer Pipe

340.34

Bid at $3.44 - Charged $3.74

10" PVC Sewer Pipe

437.58

Bid at $3.44 - Charged $3.74

1,442.75

Bid at $7.20 - Charged $7.25

662438

662772

218

4/5/95

Bid at $.65 - Charged $.68

Bid at $300.00 - Charged
$314.00

1 10" PVC Sewer Pipe

194.48

Bid at $3.44 - Charged $3.74

1

314.00

Bid at $300.00 - Charged at
$314.00

TOTAL: |

$32,467.74

1 4/6/95

1

673719

228

1 5/12/95 1 8" Gate Valve

INVOICLSNOTCIIARGUAUIU 10 ORION
Api.l 28 l9<J7-|'uBc t
(, \< I Nl*rf Jft 1007'JI (IIM)ISAI I OW M I N

68.00

314.00

219

CO

148.00 1 Bid at $1.23-Charged $1.48

1 8" Gate Valve
663134

|

1

8" Ductile Pipe

1

II

150.82 1 Needs explanation.

72

589153

(^j\

4.64

57

587710

> 11

74 Nibco Boiler Drain

COMMENT

579056

584951

MOUNTAINLAND

6/15/94

AMOUNT 1
CHARGED |

DESCRIPTION

|

|

|

MOUNTAINLAND SUPPLY CO.
Finance Charge Itemization
RIDERWOOD VILLAGE
||
1
J
||
1
1
|
1
]
1

1
|_

June 30.1994
July 31,1994
August 31,1994
September 30, 1994
October 31, 1994
November 30, 1994
December 31. 1994
January 31, 1995
February 28, 1995
March 31, 1995
April 30, 1995
May 31,1995
June 30.1995
July 31,1995
August 31, 1995
September 30. 1995

1

MOUNTAINLAND SUPPLY CO FINANCE CHARGE ITEMIZATION
Apnl 23. 1997 - Page I
G \CLNTS\ORTO0794 04NSRVCHGS2 MTN

1

0.00 1
0.00

1

o.oo

1

384.91

1

444.39 J
625.34

i

|
1

|

TOTAL: 1

703.59
875.77
959.17
506.61 1
629.66
713.78
1352.56
1328.84
1397.88
0.00 1
S9.922.50 i|

INTEREST CALCULATION
CLIENT:
FILE NO.
DEFENDANT:
COURT:

DAT!
6/15/95
4/28/97

Orton Excavation
0794.04
Otto Belvedere
Fourth District Court

ACTIVITY
Amount Due
Interest Calculation

DATE:
AMOUNT:
RATE OF INTEREST:

PAYMENT

INTEREST PRINCIPAL COSTS
30,515.85

6/15/95
163,078.85
0.1

TOTAL DUE
163,078.851
193,594.70

Addendum F

L A W OFFICES

BRADFORD, BRADY & JOHNSON, L.C.
389 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 432
Provo, Utah 84603
Richard D. Bradford
M. James Brady
S. Austin Johnson
James E. Bean

Telephone: (801) 374-6272
Facsimile: (801) 374-6282

June 11, 1997

Mark E. Arnold
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C.
American Plaza n, Suite 404
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
RE:

Pacific Development v. Eric Orton

Dear Mark:
In anticipation of our meeting on June 23,1 am writing to clarify my current understanding
as to various issues, to render an accounting as to the amounts owed, and to provide you with our
settlement position.
According to our discussions and agreements, the Plaintiffs are dropping their claims relating
to the defamation causes of action.
We have also established that Plat B was essentially at a break even, and the only real factual
disputes are on Plat C. I understand that to mean that the signed and unsigned change orders on Plat
B are no longer contested, and that the only contested issues relate to the unsigned change orders or
additions on Plat C.
We also in agreement, on the issue of the change orders, as stated by Otto Belvedere in Part
2 of his deposition, that any work ordered or authorized by Otto, John, or anyone else in authority
on the project, would be paid regardless of whether a change order was prepared or signed.
We provided to you earlier an explanation regarding the thirteen (13) change orders on Plat
C, and you responded with Mr. Belvedere's corresponding explanations.
In preparation for our meeting that was scheduled many weeks ago, my paralegal and I did
a more thorough review of the accounting. A summary of the accounting follows. Backup
documentation is available for each of these items.

Mark E. Arnold
June 11, 1997
Page 2

To ensure fairness, and to simplify the accounting as much as possible, I have taken as the
starting point Otto Belvedere's own accounting reconciliations. According to Dave Schiess, Otto's
Accountant, his express instructions were to prepare these reconciliations on the base contract only
and without regard to any changes, extras or additions. In any event, Dave's accounting does not
deal with any of the excavation extras, as no excavation was contemplated by the contracts.
The combined reconciliation of Plat B and Plat C shows that Otto acknowledges owing Orton
Excavation $8,916.11 prior to consideration of any change orders.
At one point, Otto claimed to have overpaid Orton Excavation on Plat "B" by $46,771.90.
However, when all of the extras on Plat "B" are included (signed change orders = $21,907.85;
unsigned change orders = $24,600.67; total= $46,508.52), those come to within $263.38 of the
$46,771.90 that Belvedere claims to have overpaid. By agreeing to those extras and changes on
Plat "B," that eliminates any remaining disputes on Plat "B."
The change orders from Plat C add an additional $65,263.98. This brings the total so far to
$120,688.61.
In the process of reviewing the accounting, we also discovered a number of items that were
included in the Mountainland credit against Orton Excavation which were improperly credited. They
were either not used on the job at all, or were not used in connection with Orton Excavation's
portion of the contract. These are further detailed in the attached spread sheet, and I have backup
documentation regarding each of these credits that we claim have been improperly taken. You may
want to review each of those individually when we meet. This adds an additional $1,945.04.
We also noted that the amounts paid to Mountainland included finance charges. Since the
agreement was that Pacific Development would pay the Mountainland invoices directly, any delay
in paying those bills, resulting in service charges, should not be charged against Orton Excavation.
We therefore add those back in the amount of $9,922.50.
This brings us to a total principal balance, prior to the addition of interest or attorney's fees
to $132,556.15.
As to the calculation of interest, it is a very complex matter to calculate the interest on each
invoice from the due date forward. It is further complicated by the timing of the sequence of all the
payments. Therefore, in order to simplify the calculation of interest and to give Pacific Development
a break, I have calculated interest at the legal rate, beginning thirty (30) days after completion of all
work. This figure therefore includes no interest for the first year and a half of the project. This
interest calculation is slanted very much in Otto's favor.
Calculating interest at the legal rate of 10%, the interest amounts to $27,128.61.
Attorney fees, as provided by statute as well as by contract, together with costs to date,
amounts to 521,652.46.
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For your convenience, I present the following summary of the accounting of the various
claims:
Description

Amount

Cum.

1
Taking Pacific Development's own reconciliation of
1
Plats "B" and UC" at face value, which acknowledges an
amount owing, prior to any changes or additions, of
Adding in the agreed change orders on Plat UB" in the
amount of
Adding in Orton's claim on the change orders on Plat
" C in the amount of

1

Total

J

$ 8,916.11

$ 8,916.111

46,508.52

55,424.63

65,263.98

120,688.61

And then adding back in the Mountainland invoices
wrongfully charged against Orton Excavation in the
amount of

1,945.04

122,633.65 j

And the service charges in the amount of

9,922.50)

132,556.15 j

Add interest as provided by statute at the rate of 10%
per annum from June 15, 1995 to April 28, 1997, which
amounts to

27,128.61 1

159,684/76|

Add in the amount to date in attorney's fees and costs

21,652.46 I

181,337.22 j

Orton Excavation's total claim is

181,337.22 1

There are other damages which my client considers to be significant, including lost
opportunity costs, loss of equity, and loss of utility in his equipment when it was repossessed.
Eric claims that his inability to make his equipment payments was directly related to Mr.
Belvedere's failure to make payments as promised.
Backup documentation is in the materials were received from Mr. Belvedere, so the
information is already in his files. Our accounting is simply taken from those documents.
However, if you wish to view my documents and summarjes4or convenience, we will have an
opportunity to share those materials in our meeting on^June 23y
Very truly y ^ s ,

/
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